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DEADLINES AS BEHAVIOR IN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Jean Galbraith∗
In the last fifty years, empirical work in economics, psychology,
sociology and other fields has produced increasingly powerful accounts of
human behavior. This work is clearly important at the individual level and
often at the group level, but what – if anything – does it offer for
international affairs? Scholars grappling with this question must consider
two issues: relevance and proof. Relevance goes to the degree to which
insights developed in other settings actually explain how international
affairs are conducted. The issue of proof requires us to determine how
confident we are about relevance or irrelevance. How much weight do we
assign to the strength of the underlying research, to deduction, to analogy,
or to other evidence of a connection?
Different fields dealing with international affairs have taken different
approaches. Diplomatic studies lies at one end of the spectrum. As a skim
through the classic texts demonstrates, this field presumes that individual
behavior matters to international affairs and has further embraced the
relevance of research on individual and group behavior based on fairly low
levels of proof. Fred Iklé’s 1964 classic on How Nations Negotiate, for
example, contained an entire chapter on “Personalities” and took into
account existing psychological research on the bargaining process.1
Subsequent scholars of diplomacy have similarly drawn on insights from
empirical research conducted in other contexts.2 They acknowledge
uncertainty about relevance, but nonetheless think it worthy of inclusion
among the many lenses applied to the field. As William Zartman and
Maureen Berman put it, “one might well wonder about the value or
∗
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1
FRED CHARLES IKLÉ, HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 143-163 (1964); see also id. at 262264 (devoting a third of his bibliography to work on game theory, to psychological
research on bargaining and expectations, and to studies on labor negotiations).
2
E.g., I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR
4-6 (1982) (describing social scientific research on the bargaining process as an important
strand of evidence for diplomacy); VICTOR A. KREMENYUK, ED., INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION 256-287 (2001) (containing a chapter on “Psychological Approach” by
Jeffrey Rubin and one on “Cognitive Theory” by Christer Jönsson).
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applicability of this new type of evidence, and yet the proper conclusion is
that much of it needs to be translated rather dismissed.”3
International legal scholarship has traditionally been less welcoming of
empirically grounded research on individual and group behavior. Although
scholars engaged deeply with the question of how states behave in relation
to international law, they did little to connect their theories with this
empirical research. Instead, they grounded their theories on observations
drawn from legal practice4 or on assumptions of instrumental rationality.5
But over the last decade, this has changed. There is now a substantial – and
rapidly growing – body of work that expressly approaches international law
using insights on human behavior drawn from empirical research on
individuals and groups, with special attention paid to developments in
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology.6 This new wave of
international legal scholarship posits the relevance of certain of these
insights and seeks to demonstrate it through a variety of methods of proof.
This chapter explores the potential for connections between micro-level
empirical research and international affairs by focusing on a procedural
mechanism used at all levels of human society. This mechanism is
deadlines. Deadlines – predetermined points in time by which actions are
due to be completed – feature in almost every kind of human interaction.
Indeed, to date the preparation of this book chapter has involved three
deadlines set by the editor (all scrupulously met) and numerous selfimposed ones (none successfully met). They are essential to individual
achievement, social interaction, the conduct of business, and governmental
operation. In the international sphere, unfriendly deadlines were used at

3

ZARTMAN & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing several types of evidence,
including empirical work from other contexts). Some scholars working more generally in
international relations also draw on insights from empirical work in domestic contexts.
E.g., Jack S. Levy, Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect
Theory for International Conflict, 17 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 179 (1996).
4
E.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY
(1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L. J.
2599 (1997); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
5
E.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS (2008).
6
E.g., Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 421 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 4
(2015); Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty
Design, 53 VA. J. IN’TL L. 309 (2013); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to
Human Rights, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L. 51 (2010); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.
J. 621 (2004); RYAN GOODMAN ET AL., EDS. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION,
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS (2012).
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least as far back as the Peloponnesian War.7 Today deadlines are an
inescapable part both of pre-law diplomacy and of the operation of
international legal regimes, as I show in Part I through a case study of the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
Empirical research on deadlines in other contexts has the potential to be
very useful for understanding how deadlines function in international legal
practice. For one thing, there is a great deal of research on deadlines in
other contexts, but almost none on deadlines in international legal practice.8
For another thing, as I discuss further in Part II.A, aspects of this research
suggest that deadlines can function in non-intuitive ways. These results
come largely from experiments conducted in laboratory settings, which
allow researchers to answer very precise questions with a high degree of
causal certainty. In these settings, psychologists have shown that deadlines
can trigger or increase behavior grounded in bounded rationality. For
example, people tend to approach negotiations in more close-minded ways
once deadlines are set and be more susceptible when making decisions
under deadlines to whether choices are framed as losses or gains.
If this research has relevance for international affairs, then it could
prove quite helpful for diplomats, negotiators, executive figures in
international organizations, and other international actors. First, awareness
of this research would make international actors more aware of when they
may be acting under premises of bounded rationality and thus more capable
of attempting “debiasing” strategies.9 Second, international actors could
harness insights from this research in pursuit of their substantive goals. By
way of example, this research suggests that negotiators confronting
complex issues should be wary of setting negotiating deadlines too early,
that certain types of deadlines can have strategic values that go beyond what
a rational choice model might predict, and that international actors seeking
to encourage compliance on the part of others should take into account
phenomena like the planning fallacy.
Yet these practical payoffs all depend on the relevance of this research
7

THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 482-83 (Richard Crawley
trans. 1874) (describing how a Spartan leader “sent a herald to tell [the Athenians] that, if
they would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days’ time, he was willing to
make a truce accordingly”); see also, e.g., 1 Samuel 11:3 (“Give us seven days so we can
send messengers throughout Israel; if no one comes to rescue us, we will surrender to
you”).
8
Deadlines have received a bit more attention in diplomatic studies. See infra notes
80-81 and accompanying text.
9
For a general discussion of debiasing and its potential for effectiveness, see Jack B.
Soll et al., A User’s Guide to Debiasing, in WILEY-BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING (Gideon Keren & George Wu, eds., forthcoming 2015), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2455986.
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for international affairs. In Part II.B, I take up the twin issues of relevance
and of proof to date. I begin by drawing analogies between findings from
this research and the way in which deadlines have worked or failed to work
in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention. These analogies
suggest how insights from domestic research, if relevant, might explain
aspects of the Convention and ways which it could have been improved. I
then consider the issue of proof for and against relevance. This is an
immensely complex question. In my view, the evidence suggests that many
of the empirical findings discussed here have at least modest relevance to
uses of deadlines in international affairs. But considerable uncertainty
remains – and while this uncertainty could be reduced by future research, it
can never be fully eradicated. Accordingly, as I turn to in Part II.C, the
most important question may be whether and when international actors
should assume relevance in the face of uncertainty. I suggest that more
awareness of these issues and preliminary acceptance of their relevance
would be valuable both in pre-law diplomacy and in international legal
practice, despite certain differences between these two contexts.
I. DEADLINES IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Deadlines are central to international legal practice. They can be found
almost anywhere one looks: in the creation and entry into force of
international agreements, in the terms set by international agreements, in the
communications among nations and other international actors in relation to
international legal obligations, in the operation of international
organizations, and in the practice of international tribunals. These deadlines
are far from uniform in their legal effects. Some have no legal effect at all,
such as many negotiating deadlines. Others mark a legal boundary of
opportunity, such as the last date on which a particular treaty can be signed
or a legal filing submitted to an international court. Still other deadlines
serve as a legal line between compliance and non-compliance with
international obligations, such as ultimatums given by the Security Council
or reporting deadlines set out in treaties. Separate from these various legal
effects (though often related to them), deadlines in international legal
practice also vary substantially in their purposes and practical pliability.
To illustrate these points, this section briefly highlights some uses of
deadlines in relation to an important multilateral treaty: the Chemical
Weapons Convention.10 This description illustrates how actors engaged in
10

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974
U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter “Chemical Weapons
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international legal matters inevitably find themselves in the business of
setting deadlines (or not setting them), working to meet deadlines (or
sometimes failing to do so), and deciding what to do when they or others
miss deadlines. The discussion here does not exhaust the roles that
deadlines can play in international legal practice. But since the Convention
relies more heavily on deadlines than do many other international regimes,
this discussion does showcase a variety of ways in which deadlines can be
used.
Negotiation of the Convention. Negotiations for the Chemical Weapons
Convention occurred over many years,11 and, strikingly, there seems to have
been little emphasis on negotiating deadlines until near the end of the
process. Discussions began during the late 1960s, when the Cold War
superpowers signaled their openness to conversations about disarmament of
biological and chemical weapons. A 1925 treaty already prohibited the use
of such weapons in war, but it did not address disarmament and in any event
had not attracted comprehensive ratification.12 Under the auspices of a U.N.
disarmament group that included both the United States and the Soviet
Union, a treaty on biological weapons was negotiated by 1971. The text of
this treaty imposed an obligation on state parties to “continue negotiations
in good faith” with regard to chemical weapons.13 These negotiations did
continue, but for a long time did so without any emphasis on reaching
conclusion. In the mid to late 1980s, the negotiating process picked up, and
the General Assembly began to pass resolutions urging the “final
elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.”14 Finally, in May
1991, President George H.W. Bush announced the intention of the United
Convention”].
11
For a detailed history of the negotiations up to 1990, see Thomas Bernauer, THE
PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (1990); see also Julian Perry Robinson, The Negotiations
on the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Historical Overview, in THE NEW CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 17, 17-36 (M. Bothe et al.,
eds., 1998).
12
That treaty is the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June
17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. Many states had attached reservations reserving the right to
retaliate in kind if they were the victims of chemical or biological warfare, and the United
States did not even become a party until 1975 (after the Vietnam War). Bernauer, supra
note 11, at 12, 15.
13
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art IX, Apr. 10,
1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
14
G.A. Res 41/58 ¶ D.3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/58 (Dec. 3, 1986) (further urging the
negotiators to submit a draft convention by the next General Assembly session); see also
G.A. Res 42/37, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/37 (Nov. 30, 1987); G.A. Res. 45/57, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/57A (Dec. 4, 1990).
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States to “call for a target date to conclude the convention and recommend
the Conference [on Disarmament] stay in continuous session if necessary to
meet the target.”15 The negotiators then embraced a target deadline of one
last year of negotiations. This was not a deadline with legal effect, but it
was a deadline that served to speed the negotiations along. The final
version of the treaty was sent on to the General Assembly in September
1992.16
Entry into Force of the Convention. The Convention provided that it
would enter into force 180 days after it received its sixty-fifth ratification.17
The date the Convention entered into force – ultimately April 29, 1997 –
served as a deadline for several kinds of legal opportunities. For example, it
marked the end of the Convention’s availability for signature. This was
mostly a matter of symbolism, as accession remained an option after the
Convention entered into force. Nonetheless, it triggered action: while the
overwhelming majority of signatories signed in 1993, which was the year
the Convention opened for signature, four out of the eleven subsequent
signatures were added in the single month of April 1997.18
The entry-into-force date also served as a deadline in more important
ways. In the United States, it galvanized the Convention’s supporters from
President Clinton on down to strive for the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the Senate, as required for the ratification of treaties under Article II of
the U.S. Constitution.19 In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on April 8, 1997, Secretary of State Madeline Albright
powerfully described this date as a deadline whose legal and practical
effects should inspire the Senate into action:
15

President George H.W. Bush, Statement on Chemical Weapons (May 13, 1991),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-docpg503.htm
16
Robinson, supra note 11, at 29-30.
17
Chemical Weapons Convention art. XXI(1) (further providing a two-year minimum
between its opening for signature and its entry into force).
18
Author’s calculations from United Nation Treaty Collection, MTDSG database entry
on
the
Chemical
Weapons
Convention,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI3&chapter=26&lang=en (listing a total of 165 signatories, of whom 154 signed in 1993).
19
For a description of how “with its back against the wall” the Clinton Administration
collected endorsements from leading Republicans, cut side-deals with key Republican
Senate leaders, and pushed the treaty through the Senate, see John V. Parachini, U.S.
Senate Ratification of the CWC: Lessons for the CTBT, THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW
62, 65-68 (Fall 1997). See also, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Mobilizes Bipartisan
Effort on Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1997), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/05/world/clinton-mobilizes-bipartisan-effort-onchemical-arms.html (describing how “[t]he deadline of April 29 has given the issue a sense
of urgency”).
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The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to
ratify the agreement before then so that America will be an
original party. …
[I]f we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April:
- we would forfeit our seat on the treaty’s Executive
Council for at last a year, thereby costing us the chance
to help draft the rules by which the Council will be
enforced;
- we would not be able to participate in the critical first
sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, which monitors compliance;
- we would lose the right to help administer and conduct
inspections; and
- because of the trade restrictions imposed on non-member
states, or chemical manufacturers are concerned that they
would risk serious economic loss.20
This rhetorical use of the entry-into-force date as a deadline exaggerated its
actual importance. Albright’s first concern was legitimate, although in
practice the real deadline for it was likely a week or so later than the entryinto-force date.21 The second and third concerns were not consequences of
missing the entry-into-force date, but rather were more general
consequences of not being party to the treaty. Finally, as for the trade
concerns alluded to, these would at first have applied only to chemicals
used almost exclusively for chemical warfare and presumably thus not for
the kinds of chemicals that U.S. manufacturers were exporting in practice.22
Yet the impetus of the deadline proved “critical to moving the U.S.
process of ratification”23 at a time when the Senate was generally hostile to
20

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on Chemical Weapons Convention (Apr. 8, 1997), available at
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/970408.html (further adding “I have heard the
argument that the Senate really need not act before April 29. But as I have said, there are
real costs attached to any such delay.”).
21
The Conference of State Parties met on for its first session on May 6, 1997 and
selected its Executive Council not long after that. See OPCW, Report of the Organisation
on
the
Implementation
of
the
Convention
1
(Nov.
20,
1998),
http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=3953
[hereinafter
OPCW 1998 Report].
22
Chemical Weapons Convention art. VI & Annex on Implementation and
Verification. For discussion, see Thilo Marauhn, National Regulations on Export Controls,
in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra
note 11, at 487, 490-92 (explaining how these restrictions at first applied only to Schedule
1 chemicals, with restrictions on transfers of Schedule 2 and potentially Schedule 3
chemicals to be phased in later).
23
Parachini, supra note 19, at 62.
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major treaties. The Senate advised and consented to the treaty 74-26 on
April 24, 1997.24 The United States ratified the Convention the next day,
becoming one of fourteen countries to ratify in the week leading up to the
Convention’s entry into force.25
Deadlines in the text of the Convention. The Convention was designed
to achieve not only state commitment, but also state compliance. Its text is
permeated with deadlines – indeed, it is impossible to imagine how the
Convention could function without them. There are deadlines by which
nations are to take certain actions, most notably for completing the
destruction of their chemical weapons and of their production facilities for
these weapons.26 There are deadlines related to the inspection process.27
There are reporting deadlines for state parties.28 There are procedural
deadlines related to how the international organization established by the
Convention will operate.29 And there are other kinds of deadlines as well.30
Unlike the negotiating deadlines and the entry-into-force deadline, most
of these deadlines mark the legal line between compliance and noncompliance. Those countries that have failed to meet these deadlines are in
violation of international law. In particular, the United States and Russia
have violated the Convention’s deadlines for the destruction of chemical
stockpiles.31 The Convention requires state parties to destroy their chemical
24

Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Pact on Chemical Weapons after Lott Opens the
Way,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
25,
1997),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/25/world/senate-approves-pact-on-chemical-weaponsafter-lott-opens-way.html.
25
Author’s calculations from United Nation Treaty Collection, MTDSG database entry
on
the
Chemical
Weapons
Convention,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI3&chapter=26&lang=en (including Cuba, which ratified on the entry-into-force date).
26
Chemical Weapons Convention art. IV(6) (providing that destruction is to be
completed within ten years of the Convention’s entry into force for countries that are
parties to the convention during that period); id. art. V(8) (providing similar deadlines for
the destruction of production facilities); see also id. Annex on Implementation and
Verification IV(A).C.24-26 (allowing the deadlines for destruction to be extended to up to
five more years under certain conditions).
27
Id. art. IX (providing very detailed deadlines that are triggered when State parties
raise certain concerns or request inspections with regard to other state parties).
28
E.g., id. art. III(1) (initial declarations due within 30 days of the Convention’s entry
into force); id. art. IV(7) (specifying various other reporting deadlines); id. art. V(9) (more
reporting deadlines).
29
Id. art. VIII(B) (providing deadlines by which certain sessions must occur and by
which certain reviews of the Convention must happen); id. art. VIII(D)(39) (providing a
deadline for the Technical Secretariat to undertake certain steps)
30
E.g., id. art. X(8)-(9) (identifying the deadline-laden process a state party can invoke
if it believes chemical weapons have been used against it); id. art. XV (identifying
deadlines in relation to the amendment process).
31
See generally David A. Koplow, Train Wreck: The U.S. Violation of the Chemical
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weapons, beginning “no later than two years after this Convention enters
into force” for the parties and “finish[ing] not later than 10 years after entry
into force of this Convention,” with certain intermediate deadlines as well.32
There was also a possible further extension of up to five years.33 These
deadlines were, in the later words of one U.S. official:
inserted into the text with the vigorous support of the United States.
With the information then available to us and the program projections
then being used, the deadlines offered what we judged as a very safe
margin [for the United States] while not allowing other states to
procrastinate indefinitely in their own destruction programs.34
But long before April 2012, the United States knew that it was not going to
meet these deadlines, apparently due to a combination of environmental
issues, not-in-my-backyard community concerns, and funding limitations.35
It made a deliberate choice to be noncompliant rather than to ramp up its
efforts to ensure compliance or to seek amendment of the Convention.36 In
essence, U.S. officials appear to have calculated that as long as the U.S.
continued making genuine, good-faith progress towards the destruction of
chemical weapons, it could absorb the normative and reputational
consequences of an international legal violation.37 The United States has
now destroyed around 90% of the stockpile it declared in the 1990s, and
Russia has destroyed around 60% of its declared stockpile.38
Weapons Convention, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 319 (2013) (providing an excellent
account of the U.S. non-compliance and also describing the non-compliance of Russia and
certain other parties).
32
Chemical Weapons Convention art. IV(6) (adding that “A State Party is not
precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate”); id. Annex on
Implementation and Verification IV(A).C.17-26. The annex also includes intermediate
deadlines – thus, each country is to destroy at least 1% of Category 1 chemical weapons
within three years of the entry into force, 20% within five years, and 45% within seven
years. Id. Annex on Implementation and Verification IV(A).C.17.
33
See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification IV(A).C.17-26.
34
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Implementation Donald A. Mahley,
Statement on Chemical Weapons Demilitarization before the Senate Armed Services
Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capacities (Apr. 11, 2005),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/44633.htm [hereinafter Mahley Statement]; see also
Koplow, supra note 31, at 328 & n. 58 & 333 n. 84 (providing additional evidence of U.S.
confidence at the time of ratification in its ability to meet the deadline).
35
Koplow, supra note 31, at 334-338.
36
Mahley Statement, supra note 34.
37
Id. (stating that “I do not believe that we will damage our international influence
fatally, if we have not completed our destruction by the deadline, so long as we are
continuing to devote obvious and extensive efforts and resources to the program and so
inform the other parties”); see generally Koplow, supra note 31 (describing and analyzing
the approach taken by the U.S.).
38
See Guy Taylor, Foot-Draggers: U.S. and Russia Slow to Destroy Own Chemical
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Supplemental Deadlines. In addition to the deadlines written into the
Convention itself, practice under the Convention can give rise to other
deadlines. Recent events regarding Syria provide an especially prominent
example. After the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, a diplomatic
resolution was reached whereby Syria acceded to the Convention and
committed to destroying its chemical weapons. The time frame developed
for destruction involved a series of distinct deadlines:
mustard
gas
was to be removed from Syria by December 31, 2013 and destroyed
elsewhere by March 31, 2014; other declared chemicals were to be removed
from Syria by February 5, 2014 and destroyed by June 30, 2014; and other
deadlines were provided for containers and production facilities.39 Syria did
not fully comply with these deadlines and egregiously appears to still be
using chlorine and possibly other chemicals as a weapon.40 Nonetheless, it
seems clear that the deadlines proved important in measuring and drawing
salience to Syria’s degree of compliance41 – and thus likely improved the
effectiveness of the process. By August 28, 2014, 94% of Syria’s declared
chemical weapons stockpile had been destroyed.42
II. DEADLINES AND BEHAVIOR: RESEARCH AND CONUNDRUMS
Deadlines abound in domestic affairs, just as they do in international
ones. Indeed, they are probably even more pervasive – and they are
certainly much more studied. There is an impressive body of empirical
Weapons amid Syria Smackdown, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/22/us-and-russia-press-syria-but-areslow-to-destroy-/?page=all#pagebreak. The U.S. and the Russians are not the only nations
having difficulty with the timely destruction of chemical weapons – for example, under the
Convention Japan has an obligation to destroy chemical weapons that it left in China
during World War II, and this destruction is moving slowly. See Koplow, supra note 31, at
352.
39
OPCW, Decision on Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical
Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities 3 (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-34/ecm34dec01_e_.pdf.
40
Somini Sengupta et al., Inspectors in Syria Find Traces of Banned Military
Chemicals,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
12,
2015),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/world/middleeast/inspectors-in-syria-find-traces-ofbanned-military-chemicals.html?_r=0.
41
For example, news coverage of Syria’s compliance with its agreement tended to be
more intense around the time of deadlines and focused heavily on the deadlines. E.g., Rick
Gladstone, Syria to Miss Deadline on Weapons, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/world/middleeast/chemical-weaponssyria.html.
42
OPCW Press Release, All Category 1 Chemicals Declared by Syria Now Destroyed
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-all-category-1-chemicalsdeclared-by-syria-now-destroyed/.
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research on how deadlines function for individuals and to some extent
groups, as well as some research on deadlines in relation to government
regulation. Interestingly, this research suggests that people tend to set and
respond to deadlines in ways that reveal bounded rather than perfect
rationality. As one literature review bluntly puts it, “[g]iven the value of
deadlines and how frequently people encounter them, it is surprising that
people are poor at setting optimal deadlines for themselves.”43
This section first engages with some of this social scientific research on
deadlines, describing empirical work on deadlines in relation to
negotiations, decision-making, project completion, and governmental
regulation. It then considers what relevance this research might have for
international affairs by returning to example of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It next takes up the question of how much proof we have of
relevance or irrelevance. Finally, it considers the extent to which, in the
absence of strong proof, practitioners in diplomacy and international law
should care about domestic research on deadlines.
A. Empirical Research on Deadlines in Domestic Settings
Deadlines are essential to human activity. They set priorities among
different projects, coordinate activity among multiple actors, measure and
incentivize compliance, and generally further action where delay is costly.
Yet deadlines are a double-edged sword, as the values of avoiding delay are
paired with the costs that come with haste. Moreover, both the gains and
the costs depend on human behavior in relation to deadlines – and
especially on how rational people are in setting deadlines and in responding
to them.
In what follows, I briefly describe some empirical research on deadlines
in four contexts – negotiation, decision-making, project completion, and
administrative law. More particularly, I focus on work which suggests that
deadlines can trigger or exacerbate the cognitive biases that broader
research in psychology and behavioral economics has shown to exist. I thus
do not address the pros and cons of deadlines under a theoretical framework
grounded in rational choice. I also omit considerable bodies of research
(such as work in cultural studies) and even with respect to work on
deadlines in psychology and behavioral economics, my discussion is
necessarily incomplete.
Negotiation. Perhaps the area in which deadlines have received the
most study has been negotiations between individuals. Lab experiments
43

Don A. Moore & Elizabeth R. Tenney, Time Pressure, Performance, and
Productivity, in LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD: A REVIEW OF GROUP AND TEAMBASED RESEARCH (Margaret Neal & Elizabeth Mannix, eds., 2012) at 316-17.
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have studied many aspects of time pressure of negotiations, including how
it affects strategy,44 how it affects concessions and perceptions of
concessions,45 and how it affects the quality of agreements. One important
and well-substantiated result is that time constraints lead to less innovative
negotiations – i.e., to negotiations that focus on dividing the pie rather than
identifying ways to increase its size.46 More focused work suggests that this
result does not simply reflect the fact that less time provides less
opportunity for thinking of creative solutions. Instead, it stems at least
partly from a cognitive shift: when people feel themselves under time
pressure, they are more likely to close off their minds and rely on preexisting assumptions.47
Decision-making. In the individual decision-making context, research
suggests that deadlines encourage people to exercise options.48 Research
also suggests that deadlines magnify the power of heuristics. As one
literature review puts it, “Decision makers under time pressure … are less
likely to revise their initial impressions, are less likely to deviate from
habitual modes of attribution, are more likely to rely on cognitive heuristics,
are less accurate, and are less confident in the accuracy of their decisions.”49
Where a deadline prevents an individual from gathering and absorbing all
44

E.g., Uri Gneezy et al., Bargaining under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse
Ultimatum Game, 45 GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 347 (2003) (finding in lab
experiments that individuals take advantage of strategic possibilities presented by deadlines
– such as by trying to make offers close enough to deadlines that they force binary options
upon their negotiating partners – but don’t do so as much as rational choice predictions
would suggest).
45
E.g., Igor Mosterd & Christel G. Rutte, Effects of Time Pressure and Accountability
to Constituents on Negotiation, 22 INT’L J. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 227 (2000) (finding
in lab experiments that when acting under time pressure negotiators are more likely to
make concessions on their own behalf but less likely to make them on behalf of their
principals); Don. A Moore, Myopic Biases in Strategic Social Prediction: Why Deadlines
Put Everyone Under More Pressure Than Everyone Else, 31 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
668 (2005) (finding in lab experiments that people tend to overestimate the degree to which
their own deadlines will harm them in the negotiating process).
46
See Carsten K.W. De Dreu, Time Pressure and Closing of the Mind in Negotiation,
91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 280, 280-282 (2003)
(reviewing the literature on this issue).
47
Id. at 286-90. This experiment gave two groups of subjects exactly the same amount
of time for a negotiation, but told one group that this time was more than enough to
complete the negotiation and told the other group that this time limit would make things
tight. Negotiating pairs from the group told that that time limit would make things tight
proved significantly less likely to come to innovative agreements that grew the pie. Id.
48
See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir et al., It’s Now or Never! (working paper), available
at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Deadline.LEWINSOHN.ZAMIR.RITOV.pdf (finding that
individuals are more likely to take action when asked to do so under a deadline in contexts
such as providing optional feedback).
49
Moore & Tenney, supra note 43, at 307 (citations omitted).
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the information she would ideally like to have in order to make a decision,
then reliance on heuristics may sometimes be a rational strategy. But
research suggests that deadlines may also increase the power of irrational
biases as well. One of the core insights in behavioral economics is that
people can be responsive to framing effects. For example, they may
respond differently to the same event depending on whether this event is
characterized as a gain or a loss, because their aversion to perceived losses
is greater than their pleasure at perceived gains.50 Time pressure appears to
magnify framing effects in relation to loss aversion. In one lab experiment,
each subject was asked how likely it was that he/she would tell a potential
buyer of a stereo that another offer had also been received, when in fact
there was no such other offer.51 For some subjects, the instructions framed
the transaction as a gain (they had a “25% chance of gaining” a sale) while
for other subjects the instructions framed the transaction as a way to avoid a
loss (they had a “75% chance of losing out on” a sale).52 Where the
subjects were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible, they showed
high susceptibility to the framing effects. Those for whom the transaction
was framed as a loss were significantly more likely to answer that they
would claim another offer had been received.53
Project completion. Research from a variety of contexts suggests that
individuals and groups suffer from a “planning fallacy” of over-optimism
about how long it takes to get things done.54 Deadlines are often essential
to generating action, even though people do not always meet them.
Yet deadlines do not always work quite in the ways we might rationally
predict. Although a rational choice approach might posit that individuals do
better with maximum flexibility (since then they have the most options for
how to rationally allocate their time), the existence of intermediate
deadlines can noticeably improve performance. One field experiment by
Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch gave proof-readers three error-laden
texts to read and randomly divided them to one of three conditions: first,
50

E.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCH. 341, 343-44 (1984); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 7, 35-36 (1988).
51
Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss Framing, 20
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 378, 380 (2009).
52
Id.
53
Id. By contrast, the frames in this experiment had basically no effect for subjects
who were told to take their time in answering. Id.
54
DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, INTUITIVE PREDICTION: BIASES AND
CORRECTIVE PROCEDURES 2-2 (1977); Roger Buehler et al., Collaborative Planning and
Prediction: Does Group Discussion Affect Optimistic Biases in Time Estimation, 97 ORG.
BEHAV. AND HUMAN DECISIONS PROCESSES 47 (2005) (finding the planning fallacy to exist
in group predictions in both laboratory and real-world projects and to be even stronger than
with regard to individual predictions).
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where all three texts were due back at the end of three weeks, second, where
one text was due back a week for three weeks; and third, where the proofreaders set their own deadlines (with an outer limit of three weeks).55 The
proof-readers with the assigned weekly deadlines caught the most errors,
the proof-readers with the single deadline after three weeks caught the least
errors, and the group with self-imposed deadlines performed in the
middle.56
Other research suggests that the first intermediate deadline can play an
outsized role in setting the pace on a project. In one laboratory experiment,
small groups were given the same total amount of time to complete a
project, but were randomly assigned to different sets of intermediate
deadlines.57 Thus, one set of groups had first 5 minutes, then 10 minutes,
then 20 minutes for an anagram-solving project, while the other set of
groups had first 20 minutes, then 10 minutes, then 5 minutes for the same
project. The first set of groups – the ones given shorter initial deadlines –
were more substantially productive than the second set of groups.58 Several
other laboratory experiments have found similar “rate persistence.”59
Regulatory/Legal Deadlines. The deadlines discussed so far in this
section have mostly been small-stakes affairs and it is hard to know the
extent to which they scale up to matters of great importance. In addition,
these deadlines have also not carried the force of law, and it may be that the
normative or practical risks of legal violations trigger different behavioral
instincts (or at least different magnitudes). Although research on legal
deadlines is more limited, there is some observational work on their role,
particularly in U.S. regulatory law. In keeping with the other findings on
deadlines, this research suggests that deadlines are often not used to best
effect. Regulatory deadlines set in statutes are frequently far too overoptimistic, in a manner evocative of the planning fallacy. Agencies often
miss legal deadlines, and even when they make the deadlines it is
sometimes at the expense of other tasks that lack deadlines but that may in
fact have more substantive importance.60 In one case study of EPA
55

Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 219 (2002) (also conducting
a similar experiment with term papers by executive-education students).
56
Id. at 222-223 (noting that all differences were statistically significant).
57
Joseph E. McGrath et al., The Social Psychology of Time: Entrainment of Behavior
in Social and Organizational Settings, 5 APP. SOC. PSYCH. MAN. 21, 30-31 (1984).
58
Id.
59
Moore and Tenney, supra note 43, at 315-16.
60
Alden F Abbot, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: a
Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN L REV 171, 181-183 (1987); see also Jacob E. Gersen &
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 UNIV. OF PA. L. REV. 923,
973-975 (2008) (considering how deadlines may distort agency priorities in undesirable
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decision-making under deadlines, Philip Bromily and Alfred Marcus found
that time pressure imposed by deadlines combined with agency habits of
routine in ways that minimized innovation.61 Their account bears
considerable resemblance to the findings described above in the individual
context regarding how deadlines can close minds and overly increase
reliance on preexisting heuristics.
B. Domestic Research and International Legal Practice
What if anything does this domestic research on deadlines tell us about
international legal practice? This section takes up this question – first in an
indirect manner, and then in a more direct one. I begin indirectly by
assuming the relevance of this research and considering what it might
suggest about the use of deadlines in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
This discussion is meant as an example of how insights from domestic
research, if relevant, could be useful in international legal design. I then
turn directly to the question of how much proof we have of the relevance of
these insights.
1. The Chemical Weapons Convention’s Deadlines in Light of Domestic
Research on Deadlines
As discussed earlier, the Chemical Weapons Convention has involved
many different kinds of deadlines – including negotiating deadlines,
decision-making deadlines, and legally binding deadlines for project
completion. There are interesting parallels between the role played by these
deadlines and the empirical research on deadlines described above.
First, returning to the negotiation of the Convention, it is notable how
little emphasis there was on deadlines until near the end of the process. If
we assume the relevance of the domestic research discussed above, we
would expect that this furthered the likelihood that the negotiations would
produce an innovative, surplus-producing agreement. Because of the
absence of deadlines in the formative years of the negotiations, time
pressure is unlikely to have served either as an objective constraint or as a
subjective constraint that caused the closing of minds. And, indeed, in the
ways); Daniel Carpenter et al., The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion:
FDA Review Deadlines and Postmarket Drug Safety, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 98 (2012)
(finding that drugs approved right before FDA statutory deadlines tend to have more safety
problems than drugs approved at other times, and concluding that this is likely due to
differences in time pressure).
61
Philip Bromiley & Alfred Marcus, Deadlines, Routine, and Change, 20 POLICY
SCIENCES 85, 87-93 (1987); but see id. at 93-98 (finding that deadlines helped trigger more
substantial changes where there was a preexisting period of turmoil).
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Chemical Weapons Convention we see a remarkably creative agreement by
international legal standards. It is “unprecedented in its scope”62 and
contains a robust and unusual compliance scheme.63
Second, considering the ratification of the Convention by the United
States, it is striking how significant the entry-into-force date proved to this
process. As discussed earlier, the practical importance of meeting this
deadline was modest at best, but its power as a rallying force was immense.
Conveniently, the deadline came towards the beginning of the legislative
session, rather than at the packed end of a term.64 The deadline made it
easier for the treaty’s supporters to frame timely ratification in a way that
would trigger loss aversion – i.e., that failure to ratify by the entry into force
date would be an opportunity that would be lost forever if not exercised.
Madeline Albright’s testimony emphasized the losses that would follow
from non-ratification by the deadline: the United States would “forfeit” its
Executive Council seat, “lose the right” to set inspections in motion, and
“risk serious economic loss” for U.S. industry.65
Third, regarding how the Convention’s deadlines are working in
practice, it is clear that many of these deadlines have not been met.
Research on deadlines in the domestic context, if relevant, may shed some
light on how these deadlines have and have not worked. Research on the
planning fallacy would predict that the Convention’s deadlines would be
over-optimistic, and indeed this has proved to be the case. Some of the
Convention’s deadlines were probably known to be aspirational when put
into place.66 Yet the fact that the United States has missed the final
deadline for destruction of chemical weapons is one that may not have been
predicted at the beginning. As discussed earlier, the United States thought
that the deadlines would allow it plenty of time. It was too sanguine about
the technical ease of the destruction process and also failed to take
adequately into account environmental issues and not-in-my-backyard
resistance. In consequence, we have what David Koplow describes as an
62

Clinton Letter of Transmittal November 23, 1993.
See Bothe et al., Conclusions, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra note 11, at 591 (discussing how the Convention
is “an unprecedented instrument if compared with the provisions of other international
disarmament agreements”).
64
By way of contrast, the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force in November
1994, right around the end of a Congressional session. It got no traction at that time and,
despite powerful supporters, has still not received U.S. ratification. See Jean Galbraith,
Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. IN’TL L. 247, 302 (2012).
65
Albright, supra note 20.
66
For example, the requirement that nations submit initial declarations within thirty
days of the CWC’s entry into force had an initial compliance rate of around a third. OPCW
1998 Report, supra note 21, at 3-4 (noting that another third came in over the next five
months).
63
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“international law train wreck” – despite being a “prime mover in
negotiating and implementing” the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
United States has “fall[en] into [a] conspicuous violation.”67
Perhaps the Convention’s negotiators could have made better initial
choices with regard to the destruction deadlines. If phenomena like the
planning fallacy and rate persistence are applicable at the international law
level and negotiators are aware that this is the case, then negotiators might
factor these issues into compliance design. If they factored in concerns
about the planning fallacy, for example, negotiators might have structured
the compliance regime differently to make more provision for reasonable
but unsuccessful efforts to meet the deadlines. Relatedly, the design of
intermediate deadlines in the Convention seem problematic if one is
conscious of rate persistence. These deadlines – 1% destruction by three
years, 20% within 5 years, and 45% within 7 years68 – assumed that
destruction would ramp up sharply over time (presumably based on
technological assumptions). But if rate persistence is indeed a concern, then
this uphill design is problematic. It might have been better to set higher
targets earlier, even though the risk of missing these targets would also
higher. An approach like this was in fact taken with respect to Syria. The
initial deadlines were quite ambitious and were not met. Yet they proved
quite effective in furthering the prompt destruction of most of Syria’s
declared chemical weapons.
As this discussion suggests, if domestic research on deadlines is
relevant, then it could be quite useful to diplomats and other international
actors. Quite unintentionally, the Chemical Weapons Convention may have
harnessed behavioral mechanisms that benefitted it. Although the absence
of initial negotiating deadlines stemmed from Cold War realities, it may
have proved valuable in enabling the development of a far-reaching and
creative agreement. And although the triggers attached to the entry-intoforce provisions had other purposes, they ended up helping the
Convention’s U.S. supporters rally around the entry-into-force date and to
frame non-ratification by that date as a loss for the United States. In the
future, diplomats could use these mechanisms more strategically. Similarly,
if the domestic research on deadlines is relevant to international regime
design, than it has important implications for how deadlines can most
effectively further compliance on the part of states and other international
actors.

67

Koplow, supra note 31, at 319.
Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Implementation and Verification
IV(A).C.17 (containing the deadlines for Category 1 substances).
68
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2. The Challenge of Proving Relevance or Irrelevance
This section considers how relevant the domestic research on deadlines
discussed here is to international legal practice. Broadly speaking, I focus
on two related forms of proof: first, evidence addressing the broader
relevance of behavioral principles to international legal practice; and,
second, evidence specific to the use of deadlines. Taken together, I think
the evidence suggests that this domestic research is relevant (and more than
trivially so), but also that this evidence is not conclusive.
Behavioral Principles. There is an increasing body of work linking
behavioral insights to international legal practice. A core insight in favor of
this connection is deductive: evidence strongly suggests that bounded
rationality is a general human trait and, after all, international legal practice
is ultimately the work product of humans. Against this is doubt about
whether international actors partake of behavioral traits in ways predictable
enough to be helpful in understanding international legal practice. This
doubt stems from the potential heterogeneities between domestic
experimental subjects and international decision-makers, the group-based
nature of international decision-making, and the complexity of international
issues and processes. Empirical work is increasingly bridging this gap and
showing that, at least in some contexts, the connection holds. This work
includes research showing that groups also display bounded rationality
(though with somewhat different emphases)69 and work indicating bounded
rationality on the part of international actors in certain contexts. In prior
work on treaty clauses allowing states to either opt in or to opt out of
International Court of Justice jurisdiction, for example, I have shown that
states behavior does not follow the predictions of a rational choice model
but rather parallels findings from domestic behavioral research.70
The more that behavioral principles are shown to be at work in
international legal practice in certain contexts, the stronger the case is for
concluding that behavioral principles are at work as well in other contexts.
Yet this inference can only be a cautious one. The relationship between
behavioral principles and outcomes is heavily context dependent and
requires “due regard for the relevant decision-making capacities of the
actors in [their] specific setting.”71
69

van Aaken, supra note 6 , at 446-49 (Part II) (describing some of this work).
See generally Galbraith, supra note 6; see also Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulson &
Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational
Learning, 65 WORLD POLITICS (2013) (demonstrating through interviews of international
decision-makers that bounded rather than ideal rationality drove certain decision-making in
relation to bilateral investment treaties and complementing this with quantitative work
suggesting a similar conclusion).
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Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences: Removing
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Deadline-Specific Evidence. With regard to the use of deadlines, I think
the evidence supports a connection between at least some of the empirical
findings in domestic contexts discussed above and international legal
practice. The broader principles developed from this research – that low
time pressure fosters more creative agreements, that framing matters, and
that the planning fallacy is common – have evidentiary support from a
variety of contexts. Observational findings in the domestic regulatory
context, as discussed above, appear consistent with these principles. The
prevalence of these findings suggests that they will likely prove true in
international legal contexts. Moreover, some matters of international legal
practice are largely domestic in practice, including ratification and aspects
of implementation. Here, the parallels to the domestic regulatory context
are even stronger.
We also have some initial work connecting behavioral patterns from the
domestic context to the international context. I offered the case study of the
Chemical Weapons Convention above primarily to show how empirical
findings in the domestic context, if relevant, could help with good regime
design, but I think this case study is also suggestive of relevance. For
example, the U.S. failure to meet its destruction obligations seems like a
straight-forward case of the planning fallacy. Far more extensively, Marco
Pinfari has explored the role of deadlines in peace negotiations, using four
case studies and data drawn from sixty-eight negotiations.72 While, as
noted earlier, work in diplomatic studies has historically been quite open to
drawing inferences from domestic empirical work, Pinfari’s work is the
most up-to-date exploration of how domestic empirical research on
negotiating deadlines might relate to their use internationally.73 Pinfari
finds a negative correlation between peace negotiations undertaken under
conditions of time pressure and the ultimate durability of resulting
agreements.74 Pinfari concludes that “this analysis goes some way to
confirming the argument that emerges from a variety of works in
experimental psychology according to which the absence or low levels of
time pressure can be associated with positive negotiation results in the
presence of elements of complexity.”75 Based on his findings, Pinfari
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057-58
(2000).
72
MARCO PINFARI, PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND TIME: DEADLINE DIPLOMACY IN
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (2013).
73
See id. at 1-10 (discussing prior work in diplomatic studies in relation to deadlines).
74
Id. at 57-61, 138-39. He does not have sufficient power to apply regression analyses
and look for statistical significance, and instead uses a fuzzy set methodology.
75
Id. at 138. Pinfari cautions wariness, however, about uncritical application of labbased insights to international negotiations, showing how one result suggested by a lab
experiment was not in fact born out in one of his case studies. See id. at 143-44.
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suggests that “[d]iplomats, mediators, and any actor involved in conflict
resolution efforts should thus be aware of the fact that little evidence exists
to suggest that [artificially imposed] pressure results in durable agreements
in complex negotiations.”76 His conclusions are in line with what a French
diplomat recently tweeted in relation to on-going negotiations with Iran:
“Instead of dramatizing a so-called ‘deadline’, let’s get the substance of a
possible agreement right. Much more important.”77
Although supportive of the relevance of behavioral principles to the
international use of deadlines, there is nonetheless considerable grounds for
doubt. Case studies may be a matter of looking under the light and in any
event may support alternative causal hypotheses. Perhaps deadlines have
played an entirely rational role in the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
innovative agreement could stem not from open minds occasioned by the
absence of deadlines, but rather by good negotiators taking sensible
advantage of additional time; the entry-into-force date may have served as a
rational focal point for President Clinton and the Senate; and the U.S.
failure to destroy its chemical weapons by the compliance deadline may
have been due not to an initial planning fallacy, but rather to strategic noncompliance or a rational change in priorities. I read the evidence as solidly
supporting a behavioral account in relation to the second and third issue
(and unclear on the first issue), but I cannot conclusively rule out these
alternatives. Pinfari’s results are similarly vulnerable to alternative
explanations. For example, low time pressure could correlate to better
outcomes in peace negotiations because better negotiators and mediators
happen to prefer patient approaches. Alternatively, the correlation could be
explained simply by the objective benefits that come with more time for
deliberation.
Much more research is needed to fine-tune our understanding of how
deadlines operate in the international legal context and the ways in which
behavioral principles are applicable. The particulars matter, and the
evidence on the particulars is less than ideal. For example, it is hard to
know how strongly the laboratory-grounded finding that deadlines
subjectively close minds translates to actors working with long-term rather
than immediate deadlines. Similarly, while the planning fallacy is wellsupported, there is less strong evidence about how best to overcome it or
harness it. The increased use of well-structured intermediate deadlines
seems like a mechanism with promise, but more work would be useful in
assessing this. As another example, some international legal deadlines may
trigger salience biases and draw outsized attention to issues (relative to what
76
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we would rationally expect) by states and non-state actors as well.78 Case
studies, quantitative observational work, and perhaps some elite-focused
experiments would help elucidate these issues. Especially in the absence of
field experiments – and these are functionally impossible in most real-world
international legal contexts79 – we must operate against a backdrop of
uncertainty about causal mechanisms and continually update our best
understandings in light of additional evidence.
C. Deadlines, Diplomacy, International Law
Proof of the degree and manner of relevance of domestic research on
deadlines to international legal practice remains modest. Yet the question
of relevance is one of immediate practical importance. If deadlines tend to
trigger a subjective closing of the minds of international negotiators, for
example, then perhaps negotiators should undertake extra efforts to avoid
setting deadlines early on (even at the cost of shorter ones down the road).
If deadlines make the costs of not ratifying a treaty unusually salient, then
perhaps important treaties should tie more consequences to ratification by
particular dates. If the planning fallacy holds for international actors, then
we should predict considerable non-compliance with international legal
deadlines despite good faith intentions. If states are susceptible to rate
persistence, then negotiators, executive actors in international organizations,
and non-state actors might want to strive to structure compliance regimes to
take advantage of this susceptibility. The more international actors exhibit
behavioral tendencies, the more these tendencies should matter for the
design and implementation of timing mechanisms.
Given uncertainty, what should practitioners take into account in setting
deadlines? The fields of law and diplomacy have traditionally taken
different approaches to these questions. Work in international law says
very little about deadline design generally. By contrast, scholarship in
diplomatic studies, including scholarship aimed at practitioners, has
historically included considerable discussion of negotiating deadlines. This
discussion tends to identify all kinds of considerations, including empirical
78

Cf. Galbraith, supra note 6, at 353-355 (explaining how the greater ratification rates
of optional protocols, as opposed to legally equivalent opt-in clauses, might be explained
by salience biases on the part of states or of advocacy groups).
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While some forms of field experiments may be plausible in international law, see
Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments,
52 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 176, 233-38 (2013) (giving examples of a field experiment using
random assignment of electoral monitors and another email-based audit study of firms
providing transnational incorporation services), the challenges of running power-generating
experiments on actual diplomatic negotiations, the entry into force of treaties, or many
forms of international legal implementation seem effectively insurmountable.
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research in other contexts,80 but to avoid drawing strong conclusions.81
Importantly, even where this work does offer specific suggestions based on
behavioral research, as with Pinfari’s work, the focus is exclusively on
negotiating deadlines, rather than on the kind of deadlines that negotiators
might put into agreements.
More awareness about empirically grounded insights from other
contexts on deadlines and bounded rationality would be valuable to
international practitioners, even though considerable uncertainty remains
about the applicability of these insights. This awareness should be holistic
in nature. Whether diplomats, international lawyers, or others, practitioners
engaged in negotiations can potentially benefit not only from insights
regarding negotiating deadlines, but also from insights regarding optimal
deadline design for decision-making and project-completion purposes.
After all, in the international legal context it is typically negotiators who set
compliance deadlines (and most other forms of deadlines as well).
Conversely, international actors involved in meeting deadlines – whether
diplomats, international lawyers, or others – could benefit from awareness
of how bounded rationality might have affected the choices of negotiators in
setting the deadlines as well as in thinking about how bounded rationality
might affect choices related to compliance with these deadlines.
In making this call for awareness, I do not mean to equate international
diplomacy and international law. As an empirical matter, diplomatic
deadlines and international legal deadlines may trigger different behavioral
effects on actors – for example, to the extent that law makes a deadline for
opportunity clearly a firm one, actors might feel greater loss aversion to
missing the deadline. Moreover, there is an important normative difference
between deadlines for political decision-making and deadlines for legal
compliance, as missing the latter kind of deadline puts a country in violation
of its international legal obligations. Yet to the extent that behavioral
tendencies cut across these differences, practitioners on both the diplomacy
side and the legal side should take them into account among the many other
factors that inform decision-making.
80

E.g, IKLÉ, supra note 1, at 72-80 (posing a number of considerations in relation to
deadlines, although relying heavily on examples from past international negotiations);
ZARTMAN & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 191-199 (drawing on a variety of sources in
discussing deadlines); Dean Pruitt, Strategy in Negotiation, in KREMENYUK, supra note 2,
at 89; cf. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 141 (1991) (approaching negotiations as a
unitary field across domestic and international contexts and discussing practices on
deadlines in labor negotiations).
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E.g., ZARTMAN AND BERMAN, supra note 2, at 194 (concluding rather unhelpfully
that “[d]eadlines tend to facilitate agreement, lower expectations, call bluffs, and produce
final proposals, but also lead negotiators to adopt a tough position that will make them look
good if – and therefore when – the negotiations fail”).
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Going beyond awareness, I also think practitioners should rely on
insights developed from domestic research on bounded rationality in setting
and responding to deadlines, at least to a modest extent. An easy case is
where a practitioner is choosing between options which have different
implications from a behavioral perspective but otherwise look equally good.
Madeline Albright’s testimony on the Chemical Weapons Convention is an
example. She could have framed ratification by the entry-into-force date as
a gain for the United States, or she could have framed non-ratification by
that date as a loss for the United States. If framing does not matter, than
either approach should sound equally persuasive, but if framing can trigger
loss aversion, then the latter approach would do more to accomplish her
goal of U.S. ratification. Therefore, she should have – and did – frame nonratification by the entry into force date as a loss for the United States.
Other situations will require more complicated calculations. Consider,
for example, the issue of how to set optimal compliance deadlines. On the
one hand, projections about when compliance can be achieved are likely to
be over-optimistic. But if deadlines are too early, then they can no longer
serve as a useful boundary for separating actors striving in good faith from
actors who are willfully non-compliant. Moreover, once these deadlines are
past, even good faith actors may be less motivated to achieve compliance,
since their default has become non-compliance. On the other hand,
deadlines help motivate action, especially since “work expands so as to fill
the time available for its completion.”82 If deadlines are set to compensate
for the planning fallacy and to accommodate the slowest actors, then actors
who could comply more promptly may nonetheless wait until the deadlines
and the least capable actors may wait too long to get started. These kinds of
calculations will necessarily be heavily context-dependent, but there should
be a thumb on the scale in favor of design choices that accord with
behavioral insights.
III. CONCLUSION
Where the use of deadlines and other procedural design mechanisms are
concerned, scholars of both diplomacy and international law should
consider the relevance of existing empirical research in psychology and
behavioral economics.
The case study of the Chemical Weapons
Convention offered in this chapter shows how this research might help
explain features of international legal design and improve it going forward.
The discussion here is only a tentative starting point. Much more work is
needed to establish just how relevant the various strands of this research are
82
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and, more generally, how deadlines can best be used in international legal
practice. In the meantime, practitioners would do well to consider what
principles of bounded rationality suggest about the effective use of
deadlines.

